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US economic engagement with Mexico is a vehicle for neoliberal exploitation for the entire region – the plan becomes a tool for military intervention and US security interests while strengthening its economic grip over Latin America

Jacobs, 04 – Assistant Prof of Polisci at West Virginia University (Jamie Elizabeth, "Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America," Latin American Politics & Society 46.4 (2004) 149-152, MUSE)//VP

The advance of neoliberalism suffers no shortage of critics, both from its supporters who seek a greater balance in the interests of North and South, and from its opponents who see it as lacking any real choice for developing states. The spread of neoliberalism is viewed by its strongest critics as part of the continuing expression of Western power through the mechanisms of globalization, often directly linked to the hegemonic power of the United States. Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva Campos have assembled a collection of articles that pushes this debate in a somewhat new direction. This compilation addresses the question from a different perspective, focusing not on the neoliberal process as globalization but on neoliberalism as the new guise of panamericanism, which emphasizes a distinctly political overtone in the discussion. The edited volume argues that neoliberalism reanimates a system of relations in the hemisphere that reinforces the most negative aspects of the last century's U.S.-dominated panamericanism. The assembled authors offer a critical view that places neoliberalism squarely in the realm of U.S. hegemonic exploitation of interamerican relations. This volume, furthermore, articulates a detailed vision of the potential failures of this approach in terms of culture, politics, security, and economics for both North and South. Oliva and Prevost present a view from Latin America that differs from that of other works that emphasize globalization as a general or global process. This volume focuses on the implementation of free market capitalism in the Americas as a continuation of the U.S. history of hegemonic control of the hemisphere. While Oliva and Prevost and the other authors featured in this volume point to the changes that have altered global relations since the end of the Cold War—among them an altered balance of power, shifting U.S. strategy, and evolving interamerican relations—they all view the U.S. foreign policy of neoliberalism and economic integration essentially as old wine in new bottles. As such, old enemies (communism) are replaced by new (drugs and terrorism), but the fear of Northern domination of and intervention in Latin America remains. Specifically, Oliva and Prevost identify the process through which "economics had taken center stage in interamerican affairs." They [End Page 149] suggest that the Washington Consensus—diminishing the state's role in the economy, privatizing to reduce public deficits, and shifting more fully to external markets—was instead a recipe for weakened governments susceptible to hemispheric domination by the United States (xi). The book is divided into two main sections that emphasize hemispheric and regional issues, respectively. The first section links more effectively to the overall theme of the volume in its chapters on interamerican relations, culture, governance, trade, and security. In the first of these chapters, Oliva traces the evolution of U.S. influence in Latin America and concludes that, like the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in the past, the prospect of hemispheric economic integration will be marked by a dominant view privileging U.S. security, conceptualized in transnational, hemispheric terms, that is both asymmetrical and not truly integrated among all members. In this context, Oliva identifies the free trade area of the Americas (FTAA) as "an economic project suited to a hemispheric context that is politically favorable to the United States" (20). The chapters in this section are strongest when they focus on the political aspects of neoliberalism and the possible unintended negative consequences that could arise from the neoliberal program. Carlos Alzugaray Treto draws on the history of political philosophy, traced to Polanyi, identifying ways that social inequality has the potential to undermine the stable governance that is so crucial a part of the neoliberal plan. He goes on to point out how this potential for instability could also generate a new period of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. Treto also analyzes how the "liberal peace" could be undermined by the "right of humanitarian intervention" in the Americas if the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia served as a model for U.S. involvement in the hemisphere. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre raises the issue of "democratic neoauthoritarianism," responsible for "restricting citizenship to the exercise of voting, limiting its voice to electoral polls of public opinion, restraining human rights to consumer's rights, [and] shutting down spaces to the citizens' participation" (116). While these critiques are leveled from a structuralist viewpoint, they often highlight concerns expressed from other theoretical perspectives and subfields (such as the literature on citizenship and participation in the context of economic integration). These chapters also emphasize the way inattention to economic, social, and political crisis could damage attempts at integration and the overall success of the neoliberal paradigm in the Americas. In general, the section on hemispheric issues offers a suspicious view of the U.S. role in promoting integration, arguing that in reality, integration offers a deepening of historical asymmetries of power, the potential to create new justifications for hegemonic intervention, and the further weakening of state sovereignty in the South. [End Page 150] If the first section of the book is joined with skepticism of integration as panamericanism and chooses to focus broadly on the negative effects of the implementation of these policies, part 2 links these regional issues with the politics of specific countries. This section offers articles that speak to country-specific issues in a regional context and to ways that bilateral relations with the United States shape the overall context of regional and hemispheric integration. The regional issues range from CARICOM's evolution to the different approaches to balancing human security and globalization in Central America, the special relationship of Mexico and the United States, and the disincentives for political parties to embrace the Mercosur process. Again, the authors offer continued pessimism about the process of integration unless Latin American states can exercise more control over its evolution. Key to this idea of alternative integration are Brazil and Mexico, the former more successful in asserting its independence than the latter, in the authors' view. Jaime Preciado Coronado singles out the geopolitics of U.S.-Mexican relations and their magnified effect in the region, where the United States has collaborated in Mexico's insertion into the world networks of interdependence and, in return, Mexico promotes the idea of the Washington Consensus intensely and its model of the promotion of free trade with the United States for the rest of Latin America, in order to achieve the consolidation of the continental bloc that maintains American hegemony through the use of the advantages of the international division of labor.

**Global movements against neoliberalism will be effective now---the plan’s U.S.-driven economic goals causes extinction**

**Shiva, 12** – founder of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Western Ontario, chairs the Commission on the Future of Food set up by the Region of Tuscany in Italy and is a member of the Scientific Committee which advises President Zapatero of Spain (Vandana, March 1, 2012, “Imposed Austerity vs Chosen Simplicity: Who Will Pay For Which Adjustments?,” online: <http://www.ethicalmarkets.com/2012/03/01/imposed-austerity-vs-chosen-simplicity-who-will-pay-for-which-adjustments/)//VP>

The world is in ecological and economic meltdown. Ecological limits and limits set by human dignity and human equality are being ruthlessly violated. Adjustment is an imperative. However, there are vital ways that differentiate the adjustment by the rich and powerful and the processes cc of adjustment demanded by the popular will of people everywhere. The rich would like to make the poor and working people pay for adjustment. People want the rich to pay through higher taxes, including the Tobin Tax on financial transactions, and through regulation for stopping the robbery of natural resources and public goods. The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio+20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the one percent.” But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy. The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. 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Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy. The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India. The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy. And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”. Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies. There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity. Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

**The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism**

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

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**The United States federal government should initiate a binding impact assessment regarding the consequences of substantially increasing its economic engagement toward Mexico through the North American Development Bank with regard to border infrastructure and adopt such a measure only if it can be made consistent with human rights ratified by the United States.**

**The counterplan solves and results in effective implementation of the plan.**

**MacNaughton, 11** [ Copyright (c) 2011 by Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law Clearinghouse Review: Journal of Poverty Law and Policy January / February, 2011 Clearinghouse Review: Journal of Poverty Law and Policy 44 Clearinghouse Rev. 437 LENGTH: 9055 words ARTICLE: HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS, STRATEGIES, AND TOOLS FOR THE POVERTY LAWYER'S TOOLBOX NAME: By Gillian MacNaughton BIO: Gillian MacNaughton Executive Director Program on Human Rights and the Global Economy Northeastern University School of Law 360 Huntington Ave., 140 DK Boston, MA 02115 617.373.4972 G.MacNaughton@neu.edu, p. lexis]

C. Human Rights Impact Assessment Human rights impact assessment is a process to investigate and predict the potential consequences of a proposed policy, program, or project on the enjoyment of human rights. n78 The purpose of the assessment is to inform decision makers and people likely to be affected so that they can improve the proposal by reducing potential negative effects and increasing positive ones. n79 Although human rights impact assessment is a recent idea, other forms of impact assessment--such as environmental and social impact assessment--are well established and have been carried out routinely for many years in the United States and around the world. n80 Proposed policies, programs, and projects should also be assessed for their impact on human rights. n81 U.N. Charter--based bodies and treaty-based bodies have urged governments to carry out human rights impact assessments, and civil society organizations are already using this tool to hold governments accountable. n82 Most descriptions of human rights impact assessments involve both general human rights principles for carrying out the assessment and a step-by-step assessment methodology. Human rights principles include (1) using an explicit human rights framework, (2) promoting equality and nondiscrimination, (3) ensuring meaningful participation by all stakeholders. (4) supplying information and protecting the right to express ideas freely, (5) establishing mechanisms to hold the government accountable, and (6) recognizing the interdependence of all human rights. n83 These principles--equality, participation, information, accountability, interdependence, and the use of an explicit human rights framework--are common to many human rights--based methods. n84 A step-by-step methodology for assessing a proposed policy would generally include the following steps: 1. Perform a preliminary check to determine the need for a full assessment by comparing the proposed policy to the government's legal obligations on human rights. 2. Prepare an assessment plan and distribute information on the proposal, the assessment plan, and the human rights at issue to all stakeholders. 3. Collect information and data on potential human rights impact from all stakeholders. 4. Perform a human rights analysis by comparing the information collected in Step 3 with the government's human rights legal obligations determined in Step 1. 5. Prepare and distribute a draft report with the results of the analysis and engage all stakeholders in evaluating the proposed policy as well as possible modifications, alternatives, and mitigating measures. 6. Adopt the best policy and distribute a final report that has a human rights--based rationale for the policy adopted and an explanation of the mechanisms for implementation and evaluation. n85 [\*448] While human rights principles are integrated into every step of the impact assessment, Step 4 is the key difference from other impact assessments. At this step the information collected on potential human rights impact is compared to the government's human rights obligations and thus links the impact assessment methodology to an international and domestic system of legal and ethical accountability. Human rights may be integrated into other forms of impact assessment methodology--such as social impact assessment or health impact assessment--or human rights impact assessment may be used as a stand-alone tool. The most suitable approach will depend on the user of the tool and the purpose of the assessment. For poverty lawyers, the best approach might be to advocate integrating human rights into forms of impact assessment that government or civil society organizations already carry out because carrying out a stand-alone human rights impact assessment entails substantial time and resources. However, if a legal aid organization, perhaps in collaboration with other civil society organizations, adopted a program on human rights impact assessment to assess proposed policies regularly, then a stand-alone methodology would be suitable. V. The Added Value of a Human Rights Framework How does a human rights framework add value to the strategies and tools--economic and social indicators and benchmarks, budget analysis, and impact assessment--used to monitor the policies and practices of the government? First, human rights lend moral and legal legitimacy to policy-making. n86 They are grounded in international legal instruments to which governments worldwide, as members of the United Nations, have committed themselves. Also, the human rights norms in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights derive from the dignity and equality of all human beings. Because these values are held across cultural and ideological divides, these values lend these norms considerable moral authority. Moreover, people have legitimate expectations that their governments will conform to the legal and moral obligations imposed by international human rights law. Second, the human rights framework is an opportunity to enhance coherence in policy-making and practice across sectors. n87 Governments often lack interdepartmental coordination mechanisms, and, consequently, one department may inadvertently take action undermining the actions of another department. Human rights are a legitimate common framework to guide policy-making and practice in all divisions of the government, thereby bringing coherence to government action. Theresult is more effective policy-making and implementation as all divisions of the government work under the same framework and toward the same goals. Third, human rights principles--including equality, participation, information, accountability, interdependence, and the use of an explicit human rights framework--generally improve the effectiveness of policy-making and implementation. n88 Following these principles requires government processes to be transparent and participatory. In particular, people living in poverty must be able to participate meaningfully in decisions that affect their lives. Importantly human rights also require accountability at local, national, and international levels, and accountability empowers people and civil society. Overall human rights constitute a common language that helps unite civil society organizations and individuals working on different but interdependent human rights issues. [\*449] Human rights frameworks, strategies, and tools are already being used by governments, advocates, organizers, and poor people to evaluate laws, policies, and practices to ensure that they promote economic and social rights and prevent violations of these rights. Despite the ambivalence of the federal government toward economic and social rights--as demonstrated by its failure to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights--human rights frameworks, strategies, and tools to advance these rights are finding their way into the United States, especially at the state and local levels. n89 And the more that human rights are used in U.S. legal and policy advocacy work, the more they are integrated into U.S. laws and policies and available to be drawn on when needed. Advocates should consider how they might integrate human rights into their poverty law work.

**It competes and is theoretically legitimate --- it’s a PIC out of “economic engagement” --- a responsible engagement strategy is key to broader human rights compliance --- the plan and the perm fail.**

**Forcese, 02** [Craig, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, † BA, McGill; MA, Carleton; LL.B., Ottawa; LL.M., Yale; Member of the Bars of New York, Ontario and the District of Columbia. Associate, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP]

Towards a Doctrine of Responsible Engagement Put simply, the proposed notion of “responsible engagement” holds that the objective of foreign policy should be not only to increase wealth, but also to enhance human rights observance and political liberalization. In this respect, the doctrine is consistent with the express foreign policy positions of many Western democracies.179 Further, responsible engagement follows conventional economic wisdom and posits that economic integration through trade and investment generally facilitates economic growth and the alleviation of poverty.180 It is, as a consequence, typically hostile to protectionism or isolationism. On the other hand, in keeping with the empirical data and the foreign policy assertions of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada cited above, the model does not presume that economic development leads inexorably to political liberalization and greater observance of human rights. Further, responsible engagement does not suppose that the benefits of economic integration always outweigh costs that might stem from exacerbated human rights abuses or entrenched repressive regimes. The policy prescriptions flowing from these premises are constrained by a series of moral and legal limitations. First, on the moral side, in assessing whether the costs of economic integration outweigh benefits, responsible engagement is infused with a human rights ethos. “Responsible engagement” presumes that policy should avoid the infliction of pain. Thus, where human rights objectives and the dictates of wealth generation conflict irreconcilably, responsible engagement favors the former over the latter. Responsible engagement recognizes that trade-offs are inevitable and that foreign policy strategies will affect different actors differently. Assessing whether, in net, foreign policies focusing on wealth generation or human rights conflict will remain a difficult chore. However, as a general rule, the model resists appeasing or overlooking present-day human rights violations in the hope that short-term suffering borne by a contemporary class of victims will lead to long-term gains for some future generation. Second, responsible engagement holds that international human rights law cuts both ways. Responsible engagement takes the view that action directed at improving human rights adherence is endorsed and perhaps required by international law. In this regard, the influential American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States urges that “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” amounts to a violation of customary international law.181 Further, human rights principles barring the most serious human rights violations have jus cogens status and an international agreement that violates this norm is void.182 The Restatement also concludes that these customary international human rights principles are obligations erga omnes, in that all states have a legal interest in their protection. Thus, transgressions of any of these norms, it is said, “are violations of obligations to all other states and any state may invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its rights under customary law are violated”.183 This is a view largely consistent with that of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power, Ltd. case.184 The Institute of International Law, in 1989, went even further than the Restatement or the I.C.J. in declaring that the very obligation of states to guarantee the protection of human rights is an obligation erga omnes. For the Institute, this obligation “implies a duty of solidarity among all States to ensure as rapidly as possible the effective protection of human rights throughout the world.”185 Notably, the remedies typically available where international obligations owed to a state are violated include self-help in the form of retortion or reprisals186 and economic sanctions.187 Thus, the Restatement notes “[a] state may criticize another state for failure to abide by recognized international human rights standards, and may shape its trade, aid or other national policies so as to dissociate itself from the violating state or to influence that state to discontinue the violations.”188 Taken together, these principles suggest that any foreign economic policy should—and perhaps must—be closely scrutinized according to whether it reacts to the erga omnes implications of serious human rights abuses. Amongst the tools legitimately available to states in response to human rights abuses are economic sanctions. Yet, responsible engagement also recognizes that the means selected to achieve this human-rights sensitive objective must themselves comport with principles of international law. Thus, responsible engagement acknowledges that “principles governing unilateral countermeasures apply. . .when a state responds to a violation of an obligation to all states,”189 such as human rights abuses, and concurs with the view that even U.N.-authorized measures with significant impacts should be scrutinized with an eye to these principles.190 Specifically, sanctions should be employed only where necessary, by reason of recalcitrance on the part of the human-rights abusing state. Further, the measures selected should be proportionate—not excessive in light of the violation being sanctioned. A policy of responsible engagement also responds to provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guaranteeing everyone a “standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family,”191 and invoking rights to be free from hunger192 and to enjoy “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”193 Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, meanwhile, pledges the U.N. to respect human rights, but also to promote “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.”194 Responsible engagement concurs with the view that Article 55 and related human rights norms delineate “elementary standards” to be taken into account before sanctions are leveled.195 For instance, as other observers have put it, “[a]ssuming that the target is a developing country trying to achieve the objectives set out in Article 55, the United Nations would be less likely to impose a haphazard embargo. . . . The organization would have to first assess the socio-economic status of the target and determine what type of sanctions would cause the least damage to the target’s development.”196 The U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, for its part, has expressed strong concern about the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, and has recently urged “all competent organs, bodies and agencies of the United Nations system. . . [to] observe and implement all relevant provisions of human rights and international humanitarian law” in their sanctioning activities.197 Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concluded in 1997 that sanctioning parties are obliged by virtue of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical” to mitigate humanitarian suffering prompted by sanctions.198 The five permanent members of the Security Council themselves have reflected on the detrimental impacts of sanctions, concluding in 1995 that “further collective actions in the Security Council within the context of any future sanctions regime should be directed to minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.”199 Put in more mechanical terms, a policy of responsible engagement starts from the assumption that economic integration and economic growth are consistent with a human rights-maximizing foreign policy. Yet, because there is no automatic causal link between economic growth and improvements in human rights, responsible engagement obliges a cost benefit analysis or “human rights impact assessment” of any economic integration strategy. Such an analysis would identify instances such as those cited above where economic integration augments the staying power of repressive governments or induces human rights abuses. Subsequently, responsible engagement takes steps to mitigate these negative impacts. Thus, a government may insist that its corporate nationals meet standards of conduct minimizing the human rights-retarding aspects of their overseas presence. For example, as with South Africa, many Western nations now actively endorse and promote so-called voluntary codes of business conduct pledging companies with operations in repressive countries to meet human rights standards.200 In some instances, state or economic actors may prove unresponsive to these modest means of curbing human rights abuses. Here, sanctions mechanisms targeting recalcitrant regimes may be the most viable means of effecting change. In keeping with the discussion above and the moral and legal premises of responsible engagement, sanctions measures should be carefully tailored, targeting elite decision-makers, enhancing domestic oppositions and preserving innocent populations. Accordingly, each sanctions measure, prior to being implemented, must undergo its own cost-benefit and human rights impact assessment, measuring its likely impact as against these criteria.201 As the discussion in Part I suggests, as a general rule, this analysis will likely favor “smart sanctions” comprising financial measures targeting elites, arms embargoes and selective trade and investment sanctions that affect the offensive capacity of repressive regimes without producing significant hardships for innocent populations. In sum, “responsible engagement” appreciates that economic relations are neither the absolute cause nor absolute solution to human rights abuses. At the same time, it resorts to a rational analysis of the role of economic relations in exacerbating or preventing repression and, deferring to a series of moral and legal constraints, deploys levers of economic influence to mitigate harmful impacts and promote positive spin-offs. Put another way, responsible engagement strives for an analytically coherent approach to foreign policies predicated on the twin goals of economic growth and human rights promotion. Clearly, fleshing out the precise methodology that would be employed to implement this responsible engagement doctrine goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is instructive to consider, in the remaining pages of this Article, whether the prescriptions set out here are likely to be helped or hindered by the international legal context in which they would be expected to operate.

**That solves human rights leadership**

**Wexler, 8** [Lesley, Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law “HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN IMMIGRATION CASE STUDY”, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 285, p. lexis]

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT: APPLICATION IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT  
To develop a sense of how human rights review would operate in practice, this paper uses immigrants' human rights as a starting point from which to identify issues raised by particular design choices. As immigrants suffer a wide variety of human rights abuses and possess an extensive array of international human rights protections, they provide a helpful test case for the  [\*304]  development of a human rights review process. Immigrants are subject to various and often overlapping government authorities and policies, so designers can compare different federal, state, and local approaches to human rights review. Moreover, such a model tests the limits of human rights review as immigrants are a relatively unpopular, politically powerless social group. In thinking about how to conduct human rights review, this paper draws heavily from the framework and judicial interpretations of EIS and Environmental Assessments ("EAs") under the National Environmental Protection Act and New York's State Environmental Quality Reform Act ("SEQRA"). Using the NEPA and SEQRA as a model lowers drafting and implementation costs by highlighting major decisions, providing empirical evidence, and giving agencies and interested parties notice as to how courts and agencies will likely interpret the relevant terms. Although this article uses environmental tools to address human rights problems, these contexts vary along some important dimensions, so human rights impact statements need not wholly mimic the NEPA process. More qualitative analysis such as that employed in family impact statements and human rights reports should also inform the design of HRIS. **153** As a brief overview, the chart below identifies some of the key questions that arise under their respective review processes. It describes how the NEPA and SEQRA resolve them, and then provides some preliminary suggestions for the human rights review process. These issues will be more fully fleshed out in the discussion that follows the chart.  [\*305]  A. *What Triggers a Human Rights Impact Statement ("HRIS")?* As a considerable number of legislative and administrative policies implicate immigrants' human rights, designers should first determine which policies to subject to human rights assessments and impact statements. A very ambitious review process might simply cover any proposed government action. Taking a cue from the NEPA, drafters could however limit the human rights review process to "major government actions significantly affecting the human rights of migrants." Under the NEPA, the relevant agency undertakes an initial environmental assessment for any proposed major government action. If the environmental assessment yields a "finding of significant impact," then the agency continues the review process with an EIS. This section tries to flesh out these terms in the human rights context. For instance, what types of proposals should constitute a "major government action?" When does such an action "significantly affect" immigrants' human rights? Which human rights should count for the review process? Which governments and which actors should be subject to the requirement? 1. *Activities Subject to Human Rights Review* Because of the vast scope of their actions, subjecting all of the activities of federal, state, and local governments to environmental or human rights review would constitute a massive undertaking demanding substantial resources. Yet it is not impossible. For instance, New York's SEQRA covers any proposed action that comes before an agency. **154** By way of comparison, the Council of Environmental Quality, which devises NEPA regulations, limits review to "major government actions" which include: issuing government permits; establishing government policies and regulations; undertaking or authorizing government projects; initiating activities subject to government control and responsibilities such as the dispensation of government funds; **155** and failing to act when such government omission is otherwise reviewable by a court. **156** This definition prioritizes particular types of policies, but state experimentation suggests more expansive review is possible. Under either a narrow or broad review process, however, certain substantive policy areas should be subject to human rights impact statements. For example, relevant policies in the immigration context include regulations governing: admission determinations; family reunification standards; and detention policies for refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants.  [\*306]  Other potentially relevant policies include: projects to build border control structures; the use of government funds by private actors to enhance border security; and government limitations on educational loans, housing, social services, and employment for undocumented migrants. In addition to executive agency action, the human rights review process might govern the legislative branch as well. **157** As written, the NEPA only governs legislation initiated by agency action. However, human rights violations often stem from the underlying legislation itself rather than the implementing regulations or particular policies allowed under a legislative regime. Thus, some pieces of legislation should be reviewed before they require agency action. For instance, efforts to revive Executive Order 13107, which sought to "vet proposed legislation for conformity with [human rights] treaty requirements," are already underway. **158** By conducting reviews at both the legislative and the agency level, those interested in protecting human rights get two bites at the apple. Legislative review would focus on the law's overall purpose and any facial human rights violations, while agency review would facilitate close attention to any human rights violations in implementing regulations or individual agency decisions under the statute. This article contemplates reviewing government action, but given the increasing importance of corporations as major human rights actors, proposals might also seek to review these institutions as well. **159** In particular, many corporations influence immigrants' daily lives, particularly through their employment practices. While the NEPA and SEQRA examine corporate activity requiring government action such as permitting or funding, they do not review internal corporate policies. Accordingly, a human rights review statute based on the NEPA and SEQRA reaches activity such as proposed government cooperation with corporate actors on immigration control efforts and proposed laws that govern corporate practices such as employment policies, compensation, and working conditions. **160** For example, if the federal government proposed an exemption for the agricultural industry from minimum wage requirements, the legislature might have to conduct a human rights review as such a policy would disproportionately impact immigrants. **161** If a corporation violates existing statutes by denying immigrant  [\*307]  workers wages or compensation for work-related injuries, however, no human rights review would occur. 2. *Finding of Significant Impact to Trigger HRIS* Once the decision-makers conclude which actions should be subject to human rights review, they must next determine which actions necessitate a human rights impact statement. Rather than conduct a human rights assessment for every major government action in order to decide when a HRIS is triggered, agencies might use some shortcuts to reduce their burden. Under the NEPA, agencies fit potentially reviewable actions into one of three categories: **162** (1) those automatically necessitating an EIS (in which case, the agency bypasses the environmental assessment); (2) those automatically outside the review process because the type of action normally has no significant effect on the environment; and (3) those falling between the obviously significant actions and the categorical exclusions. Agencies only prepare an environmental assessment for the last, gray area category when there is a "finding of significant impact." The determination of whether a proposed action will "significantly affect" the environment is probably the most commonly contested issue under the NEPA. **163** The CEQ issued regulations defining "significantly" to mean "considerations of both context and intensity." **164** Considerations of context include: society as a whole, the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. **165** Evaluation of intensity encompass: beneficial and adverse impacts, the degree to which the proposed action affects public health, unique characteristics of the geographic area, the degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial or uncertain, and whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. **166** The CEQ further interprets the term "affect" to encompass both direct effects as well as "[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." **167** Scienter is not required -- the agency need not intend the effects. Most of the NEPA analysis occurs in environmental assessments rather than through EISs given the commonality of "findings of no significant impact." **168** When an agency does  [\*308]  make a "finding of significant impact," the call for an EIS tends to be "the death knell of a project." **169** Translating the "finding of significant impact" into the human rights framework requires much elaboration. I intend to explore this in a follow-up piece, but some preliminary thoughts may help lay the groundwork. First, any policy that on its face treats immigrants differently than citizens should be subject to a human rights impact statement as it likely violates anti-discrimination oriented human rights. For instance, something like the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, which declares non-citizen permanent residents ineligible for food stamps and supplemental security income, **170** would be subject to an automatic human rights impact statement. Similarly, a housing policy that fines landlords for renting apartments to undocumented immigrants also singles out immigrants and substantially affects their human rights and, therefore, would be subject to an impact statement. Many actions that fall within the domain of "immigration policy" would be subject to automatic assessment.

**Human rights cred solves global war**

**Burke-White 4** (William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 279-280)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.¶ Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

## 1NC

**Interpretation and violation --- economic engagement requires trade promotion --- the plan is an economic inducement**

**Celik, 11** – master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

**C. Voting issue –**

## 1NC

**Obama is pushing a renewal of unemployment benefits**

The Eastern Tribune 4/8 Obama serious over jobless benefits; appeals House, 4/8/14, http://www.theeasterntribune.com/story/4570/obama-serious-over-jobless-benefits-appeals-house/#sthash.JNF0yvmk.dpbs

Several new steps are being taken by the Democrats to impress the unemployment youth across the nation. But this time, the US President Obama looks quite serious over jobless benefits’ bill. Obama appeals House of Representatives to grip closely to Senate-passed bill, which would resurrect federal unemployed and jobless benefits for the long-term unemployment.¶ On Monday, the president said that the Senate took a step in a bipartisan way by voting a special kind of “reinstate emergency jobless” insurance for nearly 2.3 million US citizens.¶ In his statement released on Monday, Mr. Obama called the House to keep politics away, when it comes to meet people’s demand. Well, this might sound little rude for the House of Representatives, but Obama plans to pass the jobless bill as soon as possible.¶ In his speech, he criticized Congress saying that it always fails to act accordingly when it comes to 70,000 long-term jobless Americans, who are losing benefits. Obama also urged the House Republicans to stop hindering in his way, which he regards as a bipartisan compromise.¶ Republicans and Democrats have always shown immense criticism for each-other’s view. This time, Obama seeks to pass the bill immediately, and said that the process for passing the jobless bill must start as quick as possible.

**His PC is key – changes the political dynamic in the House**

Lowery 4/7 Wesley, Washington Post, Senate votes to restore federal funding for extended unemployment benefits, 4/7/14, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/senate-votes-to-restore-federal-funding-for-extended-unemployment-benefits/2014/04/07/91f82310-bea3-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3\_story.html

The Senate voted 59 to 38 Monday in favor of a bill that would restore federal funding for extended unemployment benefits for 2.8 million Americans who are considered “long-term unemployed.”¶ The deal, carried by Democratic senators but struck with the support of several prominent Republicans — including Sens. Rob Portman (Ohio), Kelly Ayotte (N.H.) and Mark Kirk (Ill.) — came on the Senate’s fourth vote on a bill to renew the benefits.¶ The measure, which would restore the federal funding that pays for unemployment insurance after state-sponsored insurance ends after 26 weeks, easily passed the Senate on Monday evening and now heads to the House — where Republican House Speaker John A. Boehner (Ohio) has repeatedly signaled that it is unlikely to come up for a vote.¶ “If our bill was put up for a vote in the House, there is no question it would pass. Contrary to right-wing talking points, many of the people who would benefit [from] this bill are out of work through no fault of their own, and have been knocking on doors and going online looking for a job for months or even years,” Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) said in a statement before the Senate vote. “The House needs to extend unemployment benefits to millions of Americans right now, without attaching extraneous issues that are merely an attempt to score political points.”¶ Republican House leaders have repeatedly stated their opposition to the Senate bill, noting that they do not want to bring any unemployment legislation to the floor for a vote unless it includes job-creation provisions.¶ But House Democrats say they intend to force the issue.¶ The starting point for Democrats is reenlisting the support of a group of moderate Republicans — Reps. Joseph J. Heck (Nev.), Christopher P. Gibson (N.Y.), David Joyce (Ohio), Frank A. LoBiondo (N.J.), Michael G. Grimm (N.Y.), Peter T. King (N.Y.) and Jon Runyan (N.J.) — who in December signed a letter to Boehner asking the Republican House leadership to consider a temporary extension to the unemployment benefits.¶ House Democrats and Republican allies have also begun wearing stickers while they are in the Capitol that include the number of long-term unemployed in their state. House aides say LoBiondo is leading an effort to send another letter, which could include new co-signers.¶ One of the major variables is what, if any, political capital President Obama is willing to expend toward passage of unemployment insurance extension in the House.¶ In a statement after the Senate vote, Labor Secretary Thomas Perez urged the House to act.¶ “Every day of congressional inaction is another day of struggle for the 2.2 million people who are out of work through no fault of their own,” Perez said. “I’ve heard from governors and labor secretaries from both parties who are ready and able to implement this vital program for their residents. I encourage the House to vote and send this legislation to President Obama’s desk for his signature.”¶ Were Obama to commit to pressing the issue — perhaps through a series of speeches like the ones he has given around the country in recent weeks about minimum wage legislation — it could ramp up pressure on House Republicans, especially those facing reelection in states with high unemployment.¶ Republican aides agree that an aggressive campaign by the White House has the potential to drastically change the legislative dynamic.

**Engaging Mexico is politically divisive**

Wilson 13

Christopher E., Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars , January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

**It’s key to the economy – bolsters consumer spending**

Harkin 2/5 Tim. “Extending unemployment benefits will help many” January 5, 2014. <http://www.press-citizen.com/article/D5/20140206/OPINION02/302060012/Extending-unemployment-benefits-will-help-many>

For too many workers, that is the reality in our country today. The economy is improving, yet long-term unemployment continues to threaten that recovery. For every available job, there are currently three job seekers. About 4 million workers have been looking for a new job for at least six months.¶ Unemployment insurance helps struggling families and provides a major, immediate boost to the economy. Unemployed households spend these dollars on immediate needs such as paying the rent, buying groceries and school supplies, or repairing the family car — all economic activities that quickly inject dollars into our communities, helping businesses to keep up sales as the economy continues to recover.

**The impact is nuclear war**

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

## Relations

**No biod extinction**

**Paltrowitz, 01** (JD Brooklyn Journal of I-Law, 2001 (A Greening of the World Trade Organisation”)

However, the panel did not take into account the practical reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably harmed as time passes. n105 For instance, one scholar has reported [\*1807] that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000 species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day, and three every hour and up to seventy percent of the world's fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploitation." n106 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which are on the endangered species list. n107 Yet, even for the dolphin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna purse seines then their numbers could become seriously depleted to the point where they may be put on the endangered species list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of trade values at the expense of environmental values. Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble rang hollow when it stated: " . . . that the provisions of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies." n108

**Efforts to increase biodiversity are a justification of foreign aid that is part of a neoliberalist agenda that accepts environmental protection only as long as it does not challenge the fundamental devastation wrought by capitalist accumulation.**

**Corson 2010** (Catherine;  Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies, Mount Holyoke; Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation Antipode Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 576–602, June 2010)

Changing Public–Private Non-profit Power Relations under Neoliberalism

The reduction of the state under neoliberalism,1 and the resulting reconfiguration of state, market, and civil society relations, has shifted the landscape of twenty-first century environmental governance, in particular opening up room for private actors to influence state policy. This article explores how the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and its institutionalization in the 1990s underpinned the formation of a dynamic alliance among members of the US Congress, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), an evolving group of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs)2 and the corporate sector around biodiversity conservation funding. By focusing strictly on international biodiversity conservation this alliance—driven to a great extent by non-elected agents who are perceived to represent civil society despite their corporate partnerships—has been able to shape public foreign aid policy and in the process create new spaces for capital expansion.The arguments presented here forge new ground in academic conversations about conservation and neoliberalism by illuminating the concrete practices within US foreign aid through which new forms of environmental governance under neoliberalism are produced. Specifically, they draw on the work of intellectuals who document the opportunities for civil society groups provided by the downsizing of the neoliberal state (eg Castree 2008; Peck and Tickell 2002) to address a lacuna in three interrelated bodies of literature. Together, these works examine the neoliberalism of nature (eg Castree 2008; Heynen et al 2007), the growth of the big international conservation NGOs (BINGOs)3 and their increasing corporate linkages (eg Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Büscher and Whande 2007), and the contemporary move in conservation away from engaging local actors (eg Brosius and Russell 2003; Dressler and Buscher 2008).While these scholars unveil critical transformations in human–environment relations taking place in the name of conservation under neoliberalism, they have often elided the intricacies of the shifting and uneven power dynamics among state, market and civil society organizations through which such changes have emerged. By focusing on the inter-organizational relations entailed in US environmental foreign aid policy-making, this article helps to launch critical engagement with policy issues related to nature's neoliberalization, as called for by Castree (2007). At the same time, it responds to appeals for analysis of the micro-politics of foreign aid donors (Cooper and Packard 1997; Watts 2001), and particularly the sponsors of international conservation (King 2009), to advance an emerging scholarship that applies ethnographic methods to elucidate the internal workings of conservation and development funding institutions (eg Crewe and Harrison 1998; Lewis and Mosse 2006). In doing so, it illustrates how collaboration among the public and non-profit sectors have both reflected and contributed to a move within global environmentalism from an anti-capitalist stance in the 1960s and 1970s to its twenty-first century embrace of the market.Since the 1970s, environmental NGOs have successfully lobbied the US Congress to support US foreign assistance for environmental issues. In particular, a group of environmental advocacy organizations catalyzed and shaped USAID's initial environment program. However, two interrelated transitions in the relations among USAID, the US Congress, an evolving group of environmental NGOs and the private sector—which have entailed both reactions to and the embracing of neoliberal ideology and reforms — underpin the agency's contemporary emphasis on biodiversity conservation. The first comprised congressional and Democratic administration efforts to direct USAID funding to NGOs—moves that both resulted from and reacted to state privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. The second encompassed NGO-mobilized efforts to protest against neoliberal reforms and protect the environment, the most recent of which, ironically, has invoked neoliberal rhetoric toward this aim.To summarize briefly, in the context of the burgeoning interest in biodiversity in the 1980s, the Democratic Congress directed USAID to fund biodiversity conservation.4 At the same time, in an effort to counter Reagan's privatization of state functions and associated turn to private contractors, the Congress mandated the agency to support NGOs. As a result, USAID funded conservation NGOs to implement its emergent biodiversity portfolio. Concurrently, many of the environmental advocacy groups that had launched USAID's environmental portfolio in the 1970s shifted their advocacy efforts to fighting for domestic environmental issues and to protesting World Bank projects. This move eventually left the growing conservation NGOs—now with a special interest in preserving USAID's biodiversity funding—to take up the endeavor to promote environmental foreign aid. The Clinton Administration's embrace of the global environmental agenda, combined with continued privatization of government services and the privileging of NGOs, then reinforced opportunities for the conservation NGOs to benefit from USAID funding. In reaction to internal USAID budget pressures that threatened biodiversity funding in the late 1990s, these NGOs launched a campaign to protect the funding. They consolidated this campaign during the second Bush Administration when concurrent disregard for environmental issues and massive foreign aid reforms again endangered biodiversity funding. In the twenty-first century, the NGOs have attracted powerful corporate and bipartisan political support behind USAID's biodiversity program.Based on the analysis presented in this article, I make three broad claims that offer important insights into the nature of modern neoliberal conservation. First, throughout these transitions, conservation NGOs have capitalized on idealized visions of themselves as representatives of a civil society operating to counter the force of private interests thought to be behind environmental degradation. This vision has sustained their access to policy-makers and influence on public policy despite the multinational corporate partnerships that characterize the BINGOs’ twenty-first century operations.Second, the strict focus on international biodiversity has been fundamental to the development of an alliance among the BINGOs, USAID, corporate leaders and members of the US Congress behind US environmental foreign aid. By defining “the environment” as foreign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away from competing economic and political interests and in foreign countries, the BINGOs and allied partners have enticed US politicians and corporate leaders to support environmental foreign aid. They have created an avenue through which they can become “environmentally friendly” without confronting the environmental degradation caused by excessive resource consumption in the USA or the foreign and domestic investments of US corporations.These successful political strategies, aimed at mobilizing funding for foreign environmental issues, have contributed to the process by which environmentalism has become enrolled in the promotion of capitalist expansion. In fact, I contend that the international biodiversity conservation agenda has created new symbolic and material spaces for global capital expansion. First, it supplies a critical stamp of environmental stewardship for corporate and political leaders. Second, not only does it carve out new physical territories for capitalist accumulation through both the physical demarcation and enclosure of common lands as protected areas, but also through the growing capitalist enterprise that is forming around the concept of biodiversity conservation

**NADBank empirically fails – high interest rates, poor management**

AP 1 (Associated Press, “NADBank Admits Poor Lending Record,” *Lubbock Avalanche-Journal,* http://lubbockonline.com/stories/081401/upd\_075-5743.shtml, AC)

BROWNSVILLE, Texas {AP}— Officials of the North American Development Bank, a U.S.-Mexico development bank set up under the North American Free Trade Agreement, admit they have failed to meet their goal of funding key environmental projects near the border.¶ "We are the first to admit our lending record is very, very, poor. Yes, in a sense we have failed miserably but that's because of the interest-rate situation. It has been that way since we were set up," Jorge Garcs, deputy-managing director at the San Antonio-based NADBank, told the Brownsville Herald in Tuesday's editions.¶ NADBank has loaned only $11 million out of an authorized $3 billion in its five years in existence.¶ "We are well aware of our constraints and are hoping to see some modifications to make more loans available."¶ The funding is used to help communities within 100 kilometers on either side of the border with water and wastewater projects.¶ Critics blame a combination of high interest rates, poor management and federal bureaucracy for the banks performance. They are urging Presidents Bush and Fox to overhaul the institution when they discuss the issue in Washington in September.¶ Officials from NADBank and its sister organization, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, met in Washington last week to hammer out new loan guidelines in advance of the Bush-Fox summit but could not reach agreement.¶ Officials from the bank say they have only $350 million in cash to lend right now, not the $3 billion in capitalization pledged by the U.S. and Mexico, but admit they are not meeting the challenge presented by border communities.¶ "It's clear there's been a fatal flaw in the execution of their mandate," said Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, a UCLA professor who, as an adviser to President Clinton, helped draft the rules of the banks lending process.¶ "The Treasury Department has insisted the bank sets interest rates above the market rate and that is completely inappropriate for the border's infrastructure needs. It's been a wretched performance," Hinojosa-Ojeda said.¶ NADBank, comprising U.S. and Mexico state department, treasury and environmental agency officials, was formed through legislation parallel to NAFTA in 1996.¶ The role of the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission is to identify and certify projects for NADBank to fund. While only loaning $11 million during the last five years, NADBank has helped distribute grants totaling almost $1 billion to the border region, most of the funds coming from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.¶ The Mexican government has to match EPA grants when the water and wastewater projects are for Mexican border communities.

## Econ

**Manufacturing is growing at its fastest pace in years**

Puzzanghera, 8/1 (Jim, reporter for LA Times, 2013, <http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-ism-manufacturing-economy-20130801,0,7724106.story>, “Manufacturing sector expanded in July at fastest pace in two years,”)//VP

WASHINGTON -- Factories heated up last month as the manufacturing sector expanded at its fastest pace in two years, the Institute for Supply Management said Thursday. The group's purchasing managers index jumped to 55.4 in July from 50.9 the previous month. It was the second-straight month of improvement after the index fell to to 49.9 in May, a four-year low that indicated the crucial economic sector had contracted. A reading above 50 indicates that manufacturing businesses are expanding. The July figure exceeded analyst expectations for a more modest rise and was the highest since June 2011. The index gained in all its major categories last month. The employment figure, a gauge of industry hiring, rebounded into expansion territory at 54.4 after dropping to 48.7 in June. July's reading was the strongest since June 2012. The production index soared to 65, its highest level since 2004. The new orders index, a read on future activity, also jumped significantly to 58.3, a more than two-year high. Of the 18 industries the index tracks, 13 reported growth in July, including transportation equipment and computers and electronics. Four reported contracting in July, including the apparel industry. The strong ISM report comes after other positive economic data in recent days, particularly the goverment's report that the economy expanded at a 1.7% annualized rate in the second quarter. Though still weak, the growth rate was better than anticipated in the face of this year's tax increases and federal spending cuts.

**NADBank fails – environmentalists, cost inefficiencies and sovereignty**

Vanderpool 6 (Tim Vanderpool, “NADBank Blues: Will Border Cleanup Efforts Be Abandoned,” 04/13/2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/nadbank-blues/Content?oid=1083801)//VP

Still, the NADBank has been no stranger to criticism. Environmentalists condemn its secretive operating style, while others have chastised the bank's inability to offer lower-interest loans to desperately poor communities.¶ Congress liberalized the finance rate structure in 2001, allowing the bank more loan flexibility. But the criticism has nonetheless grown among U.S. Treasury Department officials, who target the bank's administrative costs totaling about $80 million over the past dozen years.¶ There are also NADBank critics south of the line. According to Hugh Holub, they include officials at Mexico's treasury department, Hacienda. "We were getting info that the attack (on NADBank) was coming from Hacienda," Holub says. "The EPA reaches through the NADBank to (provide grants). So you have the EPA setting all these terms and conditions for spending that money. The Mexicans didn't particularly like having conditions imposed on them--conditions that were impinging on their sovereignty."¶ Attempts to contact Hacienda officials for comment were unsuccessful.¶ Nancy Woo is associate director of the EPA's Region 9 Water Division. She denies that the agency is heavy-handed in Mexico. "I don't think that's an issue," she says from her San Francisco office. For example, "We have a very good working relationship with (Mexico's) federal water authority."¶ This conflict hit a fever pitch last year, when word leaked out that NADBank's future was under discussion between U.S. Treasury and Hacienda negotiators. Those murky bull sessions reportedly included disbanding the NADBank altogether.¶ Such claims are denied by Brookly McLaughlin, a Treasury Department spokeswoman. "There has probably been some confusion," she says. "There were all these reports that we were talking about closing the bank, and we never said that. We had no intention to close the bank."¶ Not true, says NADBank spokesman Juan Antonio Flores. "We learned in late January that there were discussions among some representatives at the U.S. Treasury and Hacienda," he says. "They were looking at the role of the bank and what its future may be. Among options being considered was possible closure of the bank."¶ Still, Treasury Department officials have been more honest about their ongoing complaints. "Our concern is with the functioning of the bank," says McLaughlin. "We think the administrative costs are pretty high.”

**Mexican economy thriving—congestion not preventing growth.**

**Hutchinson, 13-** columnist for Reuters (Martin Hutchinson, “Mexican industry struts its stuff”, The Globe and Mail, February 27, 2013, https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20130227/RBBVMEXICOMANU0226ATL)EFish

Mexican manufacturing is putting places like China and Brazil in the shade. Exports and industrial data point to steady gains in competitiveness over the last decade. Mexico's wage costs are up only 20 per cent in dollar terms - a fraction of the increase in China and Brazil. With Europe mired in recession, global market share is up for grabs.¶ Offshore investors seem to see the opportunity. Foreign investment in Mexican stocks, bonds and the like doubled last year to $80-billion (U.S.), according to statistics released on Monday. On the other hand, foreign direct investment has stagnated, with a 35-per-cent drop in 2012, to $13-billion. Explanations for this vary and include a big swing caused by the flotation of the Mexican unit of Santander, the Spanish bank, but electoral uncertainty and a sometimes shaky security situation are surely also factors.¶ That hasn't stopped Mexico's domestic industries, however. Manufacturing exports last year were up 8.4 per cent and represented 80 per cent of all exports and 25 per cent of GDP. In spite of a continued decline in oil exports stemming largely from stifling government management of Pemex, the national oil company, Mexico in 2012 reported its first trade surplus in 15 years.¶ Behind these figures is a sharp improvement in Mexico's global competitive position. Productivity growth is far from stellar: It averaged 1 per cent annually between 1996 and 2010 before ticking up to more than 2 per cent in recent years, according to the Conference Board's Total Economy Database. But wages tell a different story.¶ Mexican hourly compensation increased only 20 per cent in dollar terms between 2001 and 2011 while Brazil's more than tripled, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. China's manufacturing wages almost quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, the Boston Consulting Group reckons.¶ With the reformist government of Enrique Pena Nieto relatively recently elected and costs still rising in other big emerging markets, Mexico may be able to attract a new wave of direct investment from abroad. Even without that, domestic enterprises may finally be enjoying the payoff predicted when the North American free trade agreement was signed 20 years ago.

# 2NC

## K

#### We have to interrogate the ideology of neoliberalism as a prerequisite to policy analysis—debate is a unique opportunity to transform the current order

**Read, 09** – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine (Jason, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity,” Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, February)//VP

A critical examination of neoliberalism must address this transformation of its discursive deployment, as a new understanding of human nature and social existence rather than a political program. Thus it is not enough to contrast neoliberalism as a political program, analyzing its policies in terms of success or failure. An ex-amination of neoliberalism entails a reexamination of the fundamental problematic of ideology**,** the intersection of power, concepts, modes of existence and subjectivity. It is in confronting neoliberalism that the seemingly abstract debates of the last thirty years, debates between poststructuralists such as Michel Foucault and neo-Marxists such as Antonio Negri about the nature of power and the relation between “ideologies” or “discourses” and material existence, cease to be abstract doctrines and be-come concrete ways of comprehending and transforming the present. Foucault’s lec-tures on neoliberalism do not only extend his own critical project into new areas, they also serve to demonstrate the importance of grasping the present by examining the way in which the truth and subjectivity are produced.

#### b) Their knowledge claims are products of a flawed positivist epistemology

**Smith** **97** Steve**,** professor at Aberystwyth, becoming Head of the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales BSc in Politics and International Studies in 1973, an MSc degree in International Studies in 1974 and a PhD degree in International Relations in 1978, all from the University of Southampton. Power and truth: a reply to William Wallace Review of International Studies (19), 23

My central claim is that Wallace has a very restricted notion of politics, such that it seems obvious to him just who are those who ‘have to struggle with the dilemmas of power’. For him the political arena is public and it refers to the formal political process, specifically involving the academic in ‘speaking truth to power’. I think that there are two fundamental problems with this view of politics. First, it is very narrow indeed, referring to the activities of elected politicians and policy-makers. It ignores the massive area of political activity that is not focused on the electoral and policy-making processes, and the host of ‘political’ activities that do not accord with the formal processes of politics. His is a very official and formal definition of politics, one that would omit a vast array of political activities. For Wallace, ‘political’ means having to do with the formal policy process, thereby restricting discussion of politics to a very small subset of what I would define as political. Therefore, Wallace would see detachment where I see engagement; hiding behind the walls of the monastery where I see deep enquiry into the possibilities of the political; and scholasticism where I see intellectual endeavour. Second, and for me more importantly, his view of politics is narrow because it confines itself to policy debates dealing with areas of disagreement between competing party positions. The trouble with this view is of course that it ignores the shared beliefs of any era, and so does not enquire into those things that are not problematic for policy-makers. By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘private’). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the ‘buzz’ that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we ‘know’ things about the international political world. My main claim is that International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism’s commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very political view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to ‘speak truth to power’. For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace’s view of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work enquires into how the current ‘politics’ get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense. (508-9

#### a. empirics—the track record of US involvement in latin america proves that the way politics function now create worst forms of violence –history proves that the impact is serial policy failure – you must prioritize the invisible violence of neoliberalism

-market society normalizes spectacular violence globally and renders billions disposable—grinding structural inequality is 100% probable and turns the aff

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 04** (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)//VP

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Turns war – neoliberalism fuels conflicts because developed neoliberal states pump billions into defense to protect their economic interests

**Han, 12 –** British Columbia political science MA(Zhen, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations”, March, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1)//VP

Model 1 replicates Model 5 of Gartzke’s capitalist peace paper100. A major difference between the findings of Model 1 and Gartzke’s capitalist peace Model 5 is that, Model 1 of this paper shows that higher level of financial market openness is positively associated with more conflict, while Gartzke finds his market openness index is negatively associated with more conflict101. As Dafoe points out, Gartzke’s finding can be damaged by the missing values in his market openness variable, and the temporal dependence and cross-sectional dependence are not properly controlled 102. Model 1 pays close attention to these problems, and finds that, at least in this period, market openness is positively associated with more conflicts. As the data of this paper focuses on a different time period, this result does not suggest Gartzke is wrong, but further explanation of why market openness is positively associated with more conflict is necessary. The low value of democracy is negatively associated with conflicts, and this finding is consistent with the argument of democratic peace theory. The positive impact of the high value of democracy possibly shows that a discrepant dyad—when the democracy low value is controlled—is more likely to fight each other. As Choi points out, the interpretation of the democracy high variable is often difficult, but it seems the democratic peace theory is well supported by this data. The traditional commercial peace theory, which focuses on the trade dependency created by international commodity trade, is also supported by this model. Development makes noncontiguous states more likely to fight each other, as the development facilitated the capacity of states to project power to a longer distance, but development also makes contiguous states less likely to fight each other103. This finding supports that the interaction effect between contiguity and development is also robust in this period. Being a major power makes the state more likely to be involved in conflicts. Similar to this finding, a state is more likely to be involved in MIDs if its national power index is higher. However, formal alliances have no significant impact on the probability of MIDs. Model 2 replaces the high value of democracy with the democracy distance variable104 . Since the democracy distance variable is a linear transformation of the high value of democracy105 , this replacement produces identical results to Model 1, but the interpretation of democratic peace in this model is much easier. The positive and significant impact of the democracy distance variable supports the expectation from Choi: politically different countries— the authoritarian states and the democratic states—are more likely to fight each other 106 . Different political ideology can be the underlining reason for tension. As this paper suggests before, since many pacifying mechanisms available for democracies do not exist in autocratic and discrepant dyads, the same democracy distance should have different impact in different types of dyad. Model 3.1 applies this proposal and makes the lower value of democracy interact with the democracy distance variable. The findings are impressive: The negative coefficient of the lower value of democracy becomes significant again; the coefficient of democracy distance loses its significance, but the interaction effects between these two variables are positively significant. This finding supports the democratic peace argument: countries are less likely to fight if they both are highly democratic, but this pacifying effect has been mitigated if the democracy distance is getting bigger. Figure 1 presents a prediction of the probability of conflict based on Model 3.1. It shows that the probability of conflict is almost the same for autocratic and discrepant dyads, and both of them are much higher than the probability for democratic dyads. Model 3.2 replaces the low value of democracy with a three-category indicator of dyad type 107 and makes the dyad type indicator interacting with the democracy distance variable. The result shows that, compared with the base category (democratic dyad), the risk of fighting is higher in the other two types of dyads. In the base category, democratic distance does not have significant impact on their chance of fighting. Figure 2 shows how the predicted probability of conflict, based on Model 3.2, changes across different dyad types. The predicted probability shows that one can confidently claim that democratic dyads are more peaceful than other types of dyad, but the upward trend, which is similar to the trend showing in the predicted chance of fighting for autocracies, shows that bigger democracy distance leads to more conflicts in these two types of dyads. The discrepant dyad group generally behaves similarly to the autocracy group, except that the downward trend of the curve, showing that instead of fighting for different democratic ideology, shows discrepant dyads often fight for other reasons. However, the confidence interval of the discrepant dyad group largely overlaps with the confidence interval of the autocracy group, so more data are needed to distinguish whether discrepant dyads behave differently from autocracy dyads. In conclusion, this paper argues that the democratic peace model can be improved by interacting the democracy distance variable with the other democracy measurement of the dyad. Findings from these interaction models support the dyadic claim that ―democratic countries are unlikely to fight each other‖, but they also suggest one cannot extend this claim to the monadic level. Democratic countries are not more peaceful, as the chance of conflicts is high in a discrepant dyad. Increasing ideological differences, as measured by the democracy distance variable in these models, can increase the chances of conflicts. On the commercial peace aspect, Model 1 of this paper suggests that higher market openness can lead to more conflicts. This positive correlation might be explained by the spillover effect of market fluctuation. In order to capture the impact of market fluctuation, Model 4 added a set of variables related to the measurement of foreign capital net inflows to the model. The results show that, once the capital flow factors are considered in the model, the market openness variable loses its significance, and a higher level of capital net inflow is positively associated with more interstate conflicts. The missing value indicator of capital net inflows is included in the model to control the damage caused by missing data in the capital net inflow variable. This missing indicator is positive and significant, suggesting that missing economic data are systematically associated with militarized conflicts. The lagged capital net inflows variable, measured as the percentage of GDP, is included in the model, and higher level of capital net inflows is associated with a higher risk of conflicts. The change of capital net inflow variable, which is measured by the level of current capital net inflows minus the level of the one-year lagged capital net inflows, is also positively associated with more conflicts, meaning the risk of conflict is higher if there are more foreign capitals pouring into the country. These findings support the theory of this paper that large capital inflows can destabilize the domestic economy and cause crises, but they are also contrary to the conventional understanding that foreign capital will leave the conflicting region. However, it can be explained by the following reasons.

#### 4) Human nature can be changed—it’s not set in advance and pedagogical transformation in this debate can change economic preference formation

Schor, 10 – Prof. of Economics @ Boston College (Julie, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth, pgs. 11-12)//VP

And we don't have to. What's odd about the narrowness of the national economic conversation is that it leaves out theoretical advances in economics and related fields that have begun to change our basic understandings of what motivates and enriches people. The policy conversation hasn't caught up to what's happening at the fore- front of the discipline. One of the hallmarks of the standard economic model, which hails from the nineteenth century, is that people are considered relatively unchanging. Basic preferences, likes and dislikes, are assumed to be stable, and don't adjust as a result of the choices people make or the circumstances in which they find themselves. People alter their behavior in response to changes in prices and incomes, to be sure, and sometimes rapidly. But there are no feedback loops from today's choices to tomorrow's desires. This accords with an old formulation of human nature as fixed, and this view still dominates the policy conversation. However, there's a growing body of research that attests to human adaptability. Newer thinking in behavioral economics, cultural evolution, and social networking that has developed as a result of interdisciplinary work in psychology, biology, and sociology yields a view of humans as far more malleable. It's the economic analogue to recent findings in neuroscience that the brain is more plastic than previously understood, or in biology that human evolution is happening on a time scale more compressed than scientists originally thought. As economic actors, we can change, too. This has profound implications for our ability to shift from one way of living to another, and to be better off in the process. It's an important part of why we can both reduce ecological impact and improve well- being. As we transform our lifestyles, we transform ourselves. Patterns of consuming, earning, or interacting that may seem unrealistic or even negative before starting down this road become feasible and appealing. Moreover, when big changes are on the table, the narrow trade-offs of the past can be superseded. If we can question consumerism, we're no longer forced to make a mandatory choice between well-being and environment. If we can admit that full-time jobs need not require so many hours, it'll be possible to slow down ecological degradation, address unemployment, and make time for family and community. If we can think about knowledge differently, we can expand social wealth far more rapidly. Stepping outside the "there is no alternative to business-as-usual" thinking that has been a straitjacket for years puts creative options into play. And it opens the doors to double and triple dividends: changes that yield benefits on more than one front. Some of the most important economic research in recent years shows that a single intervention-a community reclamation of a brownfield or planting on degraded agriculture land-can solve three problems. It regenerates an ecosystem, provides income for the restorers, and empowers people as civic actors. In dire straits on the economic and ecological fronts, we have little choice but to find a way forward that addresses both. That’s what plenitude offers.

#### Their inevitably arguments are a link – they fall under the same repressive neoliberal ideology – resistance is key

Hursh and Henderson, 11, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS

So far we have described some of the forces that led to the rise of neoliberalism, its principal features, and suggested that while neoliberalism is presented as beneficial to all, it has generally benefited the already privileged while harming most everyone else. In this section, we want to raise the question of how it is that neoliberal economic and political policies have come to be so widely accepted, often to the total exclusion of other viewpoints. To answer that question, we show how proponents of neoliberalism have described neoliberal policies as the inevitable outcome of capitalist development where decisions are market-based, and, therefore, businesses should have few or no regulations, as in the recent deregulation of energy and transportation industries, and repeal of sections of the Glass-Steagall Act regulating the finance industry in the USA. Moreover, it assumes that government should play a smaller role in improving social welfare through spending on education, housing, or other social services. Furthermore, we use concepts from critical geography to conduct a spatial analysis of cities and countries as both contingent and particular (Harvey, 2009, p. 166), and situated within networks and hierarchies. It is important, as we imply above, that we examine cities, such as Chicago, as part of a competitive global network of cities. It is similarly important to understand countries, such as Mexico, within the context of US policies, including the NAFTA and immigration laws, and in relationship to transnational corporations. Similarly, Nigeria’s oil war can be understood in terms of the relationship between the politically powerful who benefit from the oil royalties, the government, the poor whose land is fouled by the oil, and the oil industries themselves (see Maas, 2009). Therefore, we begin by suggesting that we need to critique neoliberal policies for the way in which they attempt to limit public discourse, what can be said and thought. In particular, neoliberalism is often promoted as inevitable so that governing bodies in cities, provinces, and countries are portrayed as having no choice but to adopt neoliberal policies. Moreover, neoliberalism supports discourses that marginalize particular groups of people and where they live. This occurs, for example, when urban neighbourhoods, as in Chicago, are described as blighted, dangerous, and therefore, needing to be demolished, or nations are portrayed, such as in Africa, ‘as a land of failed states, uncontrollable violence, horrific disease, and unending poverty’ (Ferguson, 2006, p. 10). Lastly, neoliberal discourses often reduce notions of social justice to access to markets, ignoring differences in access to monetary, legal and social resources. Such an approach also eliminates the need to discuss different conceptions of social justice or the purpose of society, asserting that economic and technical responses to political questions are sufficient.

#### Neolib bad in of Mexico – neoliberal policies are the root cause of violence, oppression, warming, and instability– the price to pay is too high

**Greenberg, 12**, - Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan (James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,” *Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico,* University Press of Colorado, pp 334-335)//SG

Neoliberalism also underlies the growing problems of crime and violence affecting Mexico more broadly. The policies that ruined smallholder agriculture also made the country receptive to growing marijuana and poppies, thereby open- ing spaces into which drug cartels moved (see the chapter by Emanuel and chapter 9 by Weaver, this volume). The money from the drug trade has had a pernicious effect on Mexican society, creating extensive problems of corruption and increas- ing levels of violence (Campbell 2009).Neoliberal policies have driven millions of Mexicans into economic exile and helped turn Mexico into a major source of drugs. Both drugs and victims of structural violence spill across the border, as does the violence that too often accompanies them, reminding us that we live in a global society and thatneoliberalism in Mexico also has direct consequences for the United States.As we have seen with the near collapse of global financial mar- kets, problems are contagious in an increasingly integrated global economy. Just as the consequences of neoliberal policies in Mexico spill over into the United States, the impacts of US applications of neoliberalism reverberate in Mexico. As the popular saying goes, “When the United States catches a cold, Mexico catches pneumonia.” Tight credit affects commodity chains, so the consequences of the neoliberal debacle in US financial markets are felt strongly in Mexico. In sum, our major area of unease regarding neoliberalism is that, as an eco- nomic framework, the lopsided version of development it delivers comes at too high a price.While neoliberalism may further global capitalism’s frantic drive for expansion and increased profit, it has not resolved intra- and inter-nation prob- lems of inequality, environmental degradation, unequal distribution of resources and gains, global warming, lack of healthcare, instability of pension funds, cor- ruption, and clientelism. Instead, it has increased violence and oppression and generally worsened working and living conditions.

# 1NR

## Relations

#### 30% of all species became extinct in the last 35 years

**CBC, 08** (5/16/08 Canadian Broadcasting company http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/05/16/species-decline.html)

Human activity is wiping out close to one per cent of every other species on Earth every year, a global environmental report said Friday. The Living Planet Index, compiled by the World Wildlife Fund, the Zoological Society of London and the Global Footprint Network, said the population of birds, fish, mammals, reptiles and amphibians has dropped by almost a third in the last 35 years. "You'd have to go back to the extinction of the dinosaurs to see a decline as rapid as this," said Jonathan Loh, editor of the report. The main reasons for species extinction are pollution, farming and urban expansion, overfishing and hunting, the report said. Between 1960 and 2000, the world's population doubled, said Ben Collen, one of the authors of the report. Decline 'caused by humans' "Yet during the same period, animal populations have declined by 30 per cent on average. It's beyond doubt that this decline has been caused by humans," he said. The report tracks birds, fish, mammals, reptiles and amphibians around the world. Marine bird species alone have fallen by 30 per cent between 1995 and 2005, it said. As well, between 1970 and 2005, land-based species fell by 25 per cent, marine by 28 per cent and freshwater by 29 per cent. "Biodiversity underpins the health of the planet and has a direct impact on all our lives, so it is alarming that despite an increased awareness of environmental issues we continue to see a downtrend trend," said WWF campaign head Colin Butfield. The report comes in the lead up to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Bonn next week. More than 5,000 delegates will gather from May 19-30 to "discuss the protection and the preservation of species and habitats, a sustainable use of biological diversity as well as a fair distribution of access and exploitation," the conference website says.

## Econ

#### Too many alt causes for them to solve

**Jasinowski 4-22-2013** (Jerry Jasinowshi, Former President of the National Association of Manufacturers, “A Real Manufacturing Resurgence.” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/manufacturing-comeback_b_3131062.html> )//NR

There are contradictory analyses in the media about a resurgence of manufacturing - some praising it as the second coming and others insisting it is imaginary. For instance, on April 2, The Washington Post featured a front page report of European manufacturers setting up shop in the U.S. to take advantage of low natural gas prices, while the *New York Times* had a [story on the front page](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/economy/rumors-of-a-cheap-energy-jobs-boom-remain-just-that.html?pagewanted=all) of its business section entitled "Manufacturing's Mirage, A Jobs Boom Built on Cheap Energy Has Yet To Appear." In reality, there is no contradiction. Even the optimistic souls like me who perceive a resurgence in manufacturing do not contend manufacturing will ever be the fountain of jobs that it once was. It is a fact of life that low skill manufacturing jobs have fled the U.S. and they are increasingly fleeing developing nations as more and more rote tasks are automated. Even so, manufacturing remains a key driving force of economy growth and a critical seedbed for innovation. Akio Morita, the founder of Sony, said years ago that the world power that loses its manufacturing base will cease to be a world power. That is why the Chinese are so determined to build their manufacturing sector. Manufacturing is key to economic growth. The reality on the ground is that U.S. manufacturing is today giving a good account of itself, but with sensible incentives, it could do much more. Thomas J. Duesterberg of the Aspen Institute suggests there is a realistic path for growing manufacturing's contribution to GDP by 4 percentage points, from 11.6 percent to 15.8 percent by 2025. To do it, he advocates: • Expanding exports and reducing imports. We need a much more aggressive effort to open foreign markets to our exports, a greater effort to promote exports, and a tougher stand on violations of trade agreements, such as currency manipulation. • We need a clear strategy for taking advantage of plentiful and cheaper natural gas that is attracting foreign investment. In many key manufacturing sectors, this gives us a once in a lifetime opportunity to grow and expand. • We must intensify our investments in productivity gains, knowing our competitors are nipping at our heels, and we should also streamline the U.S. regulatory process and apply manufacturing technology to the service industries. • We need a coherent national commitment to endow workers with the skills they need in modern manufacturing. For though manufacturing will never again be the fountain of jobs it once was, it is creating millions of fresh opportunities for qualified people. The Aspen Study on the Manufacturing Resurgence provides a practical framework for increasing manufacturing's contribution to economic growth, and the corporate and public policies we need to make it happen. We should read it and heed it.

**Congestion is exaggerated – it has a minimal effect on the economy.**

**Mallett 7** – Analyst in Transportation Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division (William John Mallett, “Surface Transportation Congestion: Policy and Issues”, CRS Report For Congress, 5/10/07, http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/3E559F5A-9958-4F05-816C-1EC02069BAE3/0/SurfaceTransportationCongestionPolicyandIssuesCRS.pdf | AK)

It is commonplace these days to attempt to quantify the costs of congestion and add them together to arrive at a total cost of congestion to the economy, sometimes expressed as a share of GDP. This approach is particularly common

in accounting for the costs of road traffic congestion, as TTI does in terms of extra time and fuel, and other researchers have attempted to calculate more comprehensively. 155 There are, however, some problems with this approach. These cost estimates are often based on the premise of “free-flowing traffic,” which, as discussed above, tends to exaggerate the amount of congestion experienced. Furthermore, total cost estimates suggest that there is a monetary windfall waiting to be distributed to every household, when in reality, eliminating congestion, if it were possible, would only save most travelers a few minutes on peak-period trips. 156 Consequently, a number of experts question the calculation of total costs and suggest that what matters in practical terms is the change in the cost of congestion brought about by a specific feasible projects or act of policy.... As economists would say, we need to change our thinking from total costs to marginal costs. 15